State v. Goff (2010)
Question: Is it a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right for a trial court to compel a defendant to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by a prosecution expert in response to the defense of Battered-Woman Syndrome?
Holding: The trial court’s order compelling the defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination by a prosecution expert – in response to the defendant’s claim of self-defense supported by expert testimony on Battered-Woman Syndrome – did not violate the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. However, to preserve that right for the defendant, the evaluation and testimony from the state’s expert should be limited to information related to BWS and whether BWS influenced the defendant’s actions.
US v. Comstock (2009)
Question: Did Congress have the authority to enact the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act (which can confine a person solely because of “sexual dangerousness”)?
Holding: Yes; the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution grants Congress authority to enact the Walsh Act.
US v. Greer (1998)
Question: Does malingering qualify as obstruction of justice?
Holding: Malingering is volitional, and personality disorders do not constitute serious mental illness. Intentional obstruction of justice (providing false evidence intended to derail the process) can receive a sentence enhancement.
Vitek v. Jones (1980)
Question: What due process protections are afforded to prisoners in need of mental health treatment that is not available to them within their facility? What procedural safeguards must be implemented prior to any transfers for that purpose?
Holding: Prisoners faced with further deprivation of liberty that accompanies the involuntary transfer from prison to a psychiatric facility must be afforded additional procedural safeguards. “A prisoner thought be suffering from a mental disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment probably has even greater need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights.”
Wainwright v. Greenfield (1986)
Question: Does the use of post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of sanity violate the Due Process Clause?
Holding: Yes; the prosecutor’s impeachment of the defendants’ exculpatory testimony by asking them on cross-examination why they had not explained their conduct at the time of their arrest was fundamentally unfair, and therefore violated the Due Process Clause. The source of the unfairness was the implicit assurance contained in Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty.